Group management is a fundamental building block of today's Internet applications. Mailing lists, chat systems, collaborative document editing, even well established online social networks such as Twitter and Facebook also use group management systems. In many cases, group security is required to restrict access and visibility of data in a group only to members of the group. Some applications also require privacy by keeping group members anonymous and unlinkable. Group management systems routinely rely on a central authority that manages and controls the infrastructure and data of the system. This can negatively impact the privacy and scalability properties of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of group, also referred to as social order [5] is a fairly natural way to manage interactions in our daily social life [23] . Many of today's Internet applications use a group management system: mailing lists, chat systems or collaborative document editing systems. From a security and privacy perspective, it is desirable that group information is not accessible to anyone outside the group.
Current group management systems often rely on a central authority that manages and controls the system's infrastructure and data. Requiring this so-called single point of trust has two main drawbacks. (i) Privacy: personal user information used during group communication may become visible to the central authority, (ii) Scalability: the scalability of the system depends on the capacity of the central authority to dimension the infrastructure resources according to the load on the service. While contributions have been made to address privacy concerns [6, 4] or scalability issues [26] in social networks, none of these approaches address both issues at the same time. A distributed system with no central authority has the potential to address those issues jointly.
We are interested in building a distributed group management system with good security and privacy properties, while removing any single point of trust. Removing the single point trust opens the system to Sybil attacks [17, 12] , similarly to other systems [31, 19, 32] . No central authority can guarantee that the nodes of the system are honest, nor guarantee the identities of the nodes. We are interested in the security and privacy we can achieve against an adversary that controls or compromises some participating nodes. Whisper [29] has similar objectives and specifically focuses on confidential communication within existing groups. To do so, Whisper combines gossip-based communication protocols and onion routing. In this paper, we focus on a broader set of services that allow building a complete group management system.
Contributions The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) We design a completely distributed approach for group management, based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) . We specify a protocol that enables distributed group management with security and privacy properties on top of a DHT. An important property of our system is that it is generic and agnostic of higher layer applications; thus it may be easily leveraged as a building block in any application that requires a group management capability.
(ii) We address the security and privacy problems that have been introduced by removing the central authority and by moving to a completely distributed architecture. We study the set of security properties offered against adversaries that compromised nodes of the system. This includes confidentiality and integrity of group information against a Dolev-Yao adversary [16] . The system also enables user anonymity and ensures that users belonging to two different groups stay unlinkable. If required by group policy, anonymous communication between group members is also possible. We provide a formal validation of confidentiality and integrity properties of the protocol using AVISPA [2] and discuss to what extent the proposed system meets the privacy objectives.
(iii) Finally, we present a prototype of our protocol, built on top of the Vuze DHT. While the unoptimized Vuze DHT does introduce some overheads, we demonstrate the feasibility of performing distributed, private group management without a heavy performance cost.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces, at a high level, the proposed group Figure 1 . Our group structure, that allows distribution and privacy. management system. Section III describes the security objectives, the adversaries, the cryptographic means and details the protocol. In Section IV we analyze the security and privacy properties of the system. We then present in Section V a prototype of our system, and the results of a 60 hours execution. Related work is presented in Section VI and conclusion is given in Section VII.
II. A DISTRIBUTED GROUP MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A. Motivating example
Collaborative document editing is an example where users want visible actions to be restricted to a trusted group of people. Our group management system allows the creation of a group dedicated to specific documents and provides access controls for a group administrator to restrict the set of people that can edit/view the documents. Our system also supports truly anonymous document editing, and also to hide the pseudonym of the editing entity. Modifications are saved and accessible on nodes participating to the group management system, in a distributed fashion, thus allowing a large number of users to edit the same document. Users that are banned from the group, those that have left the group, or any entity outside the group, are not able to perform editions, nor to read the document.
B. System schematic
A distributed hash table [22] is a well known tool when it comes to decentralized and scalable peer to peer communication. It exports a basic interface providing PUT and GET operations, allowing to map < key, value > pairs to nodes participating in the system. This is done by hashing an object's content or identifier, in order to obtain a random address on the DHT's address space (typically of size 160 bits, as e.g. in the Vuze's DHT). Nodes are themselves responsible for a subset of this space, based on their position in the DHT.
In this paper, we assume a Byzantine Fault Tolerant DHT for building our system. Indeed, recent advances make DHTs tolerant to Byzantine adversaries, while conserving logarithmic cost of operation in expectation [34] . Basic storage systems on top of DHTs [28] can also implement Byzantine fault tolerant replication in relatively stable environments, using mechanisms providing consistency [30] . Handling both dynamicity and Byzantine nodes is a hot topic [8, 14] .
The basic structure of our system is the group. This structure includes the most essential elements of what is used in an online social network: a root, a list, a wall and an inbox (as depicted in Figure 1 ). Each element is stored at a specific address in the DHT. The root is the entry point of a group structure; it is a file containing metadata about the group's attributes, and pointers to the addresses of the list, wall and inbox (according to the group policy). The list references the members of the group that can be principals and other groups. The inbox is a list of messages, typically join request from principals. Finally, the wall contains raw data such as objects (if their size is small) or references to objects (e.g. URLs), and system messages. Users create principals to join groups, possibly one new principal for each joined group. A principal is a structure with a root and an inbox. A set of roles exists for the group structure: Group creators can create and destroy groups and define the join policy and the visibility policy of the group, as illustrated in Table I . Group administrators handle join requests and leave requests. They update the member list accordingly. Group members access group data and interact with other members, depending on the defined privacy and security policy. The roles creator, administrator and member depend on the knowledge of cryptographic keys described in Section III-B.
Our system is made available to programmers through an API, providing basic operations to create, manage, join, leave, list members of a group, or to send a message to a given principal or to the whole group for instance. Figure 2 h presents a high level view of the system, with applications leveraging groups of users.
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C. Benefits and properties
Our group management system is generic in the sense that the operations it provides are general yet powerful enough to be leveraged by multiple social-based applications. When a group is formed, it can be accessed by different applications, providing reusability. In other words, a group instance can be used by multiple applications at runtime, without the need for those applications to collaborate or to be aware of each other's existence. Finally, applicability comes from the fact that our system can run on commodity hardware, avoiding the need for investment in a server farm or rental of a specific cloud service. Finally, relying on a DHT and distributing responsibilities to random nodes allows our system to scale in the number of users and in the number of groups. Scalability in the number of users per group can be an issue for very large groups, as nodes hosting structures may be contacted frequently. Likewise, as in any management system where human intervention is required (e.g. to validate requests), the administration task may become a performance bottleneck. However, studies [23] reveal that group sizes are following a power-law distribution, with a vast majority of groups containing only few members. For very large groups, we do not claim to provide better scalability than traditional distributed applications as for instance publish/subscribe systems, also relying on master nodes in DHTs [11] .
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
This section provides a detailed description of our protocol. We first express our security and privacy requirements, then describe the cryptographic means used, and finally describe the messages of our protocol for different group management operations.
A. Security and privacy objectives
In this work, we focus on the attacks that become possible because of the distributed nature of our group management system: some nodes providing storage and CPU resources could be under the control of an adversary. Attacks leading to user profiling and de-anonymization [7, 33] have been demonstrated against deployed online social networks. These attacks rely on publicly available group member lists. Our system does not claim additional resistance to such attacks for groups with publicly available member lists.
Our security objectives are relative to the Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary [16] . The DY adversary fully controls the network and some nodes but can not reverse any cryptographic operation. Our security objectives are:
• Ensure the confidentiality of private and secret keys, see Table II . • Ensure the access to public keys according to group policy. • Ensure access control to group information (wall, list, membership) according to group policy. • Ensure the integrity of messages sent by participants.
• Ensure the security of the capture and update mechanism (see III-B). Regarding availability, we discuss the risk of an adversary flooding the DHT or squatting addresses 1 .
The privacy objectives listed below are relative to an adversary that adheres to the protocol but uses information from controlled nodes and observed messages to gain additional information. Following the terminology of Pfitzman et al. [25] , the privacy objectives are:
• Members anonymity: the adversary can not retrieve the identity of a group member. • Senders anonymity: the adversary can not retrieve the sender of a private message. • IP address unlinkability: the adversary can not associate group members with IP addresses, and thus use the IP address as an identifier. • Members unlinkability: the adversary shall not link two identities in the system. In particular he shall not infer that a principal is member of two different groups. Our system does not provide unobservability. An adversary may infer group information like estimating cardinality or the frequency of actions. However we discuss how a sufficiently large DHT together with the associated PUT/GET API could complicate the observability. Note that there are obvious limitations to the above privacy objectives such as principals explicitly revealing their identities. We do not protect against such situations where the threat is external to the system.
Structure Storage address Clear-text
Signing key
Encryption key Counter root h(Kr) 
B. Cryptographic means
We now describe a set of mechanisms to achieve the privacy objectives laid out in the previous subsection. First, the usage of cryptographically generated address (CGA) [24, 3] on the DHT ensures that only the owner of a given publicprivate key pair is able to control the calculated address. The CGA is calculated using a hash function, denoted as h() hereafter, on the structure's public key. Second, each node of the DHT verifies the signatures of data stored at an address that the node currently hosts. The nodes deny updates if the data is not signed with the private key used by the CGA mechanism. We call this mechanism the secure address capture and a secure update mechanism. Finally, users of the group communication system do not need to run individual nodes. Instead, the users use PUT and GET operations to write and retrieve data at specific addresses in the DHT. Thus, users never communicate directly with each other, which allows keeping them anonymous. This concept is similar to the usage of post-office boxes in the postal system.
All data structures have a set of cryptographic keys. Public-private key pairs ensure the structure's integrity and are used to distribute write permissions to the users. Symmetric keys ensure the structure's confidentiality and are used to distribute read permissions to the users.
All root, list and wall structures are self-signed using the structure's public and private key pair K, K −1 . In order to allow verification of the signatures by the storing nodes themselves and by anyone retrieving the structure, the public key K is also stored in clear-text at the structure's storage address h(K). Each self-signed structure has a counter c that is incremented at each update to prevent replay attacks.
The address capture is successful if the storing node verifies that the address is empty and c = 0. The update is successful when the storing node verifies that the address is not empty and the signing key is unchanged and the counter is correctly incremented 2 .
The inbox structure is not self signed as a whole and not subject to the capture and update mechanism. This allows anyone to write into the inbox. However, each message is self-signed using the sender's keys. In order to preserve the senders anonymity against the storing node, the sender's public key is encrypted within the sent message using the receiver's public key (see Section III-C). Table II gives an overview of the different keys and addresses used by the system. The root structure is not encrypted. Thus, any user knowing the public key K r or the address h(K r ) is able to retrieve the root structure. However, the root structure's integrity and write protection is ensured by the public private key pair K r , K −1 r . K r is stored in clear-text at the address h(K r ), which allows nodes and users to verify the integrity and correct location of the structure. The member list is encrypted with a key S l and signed by the key K −1 l . Any user having the key K −1 l and S l can update the member list. Any user having the key S l can read the member list. Similarly to the root structure, K l is stored in clear-text at the address h(K l ). The wall is encrypted with key S w and signed by the key K −1 w . Anyone knowing S w can read the data on the wall. Anyone having K −1 w and S w can write on the wall. K w is stored in clear-text at the address h(K w ). Finally, the integrity of the inbox is not protected. However each stored message in the inbox is encrypted with the public key K i of the inbox. In addition, the sender of a message also signs the message with its private key.
The table below summarizes keys required for each of the roles introduced in Section II. Members receive keys for a given group according to the group policy.
Role
Required keys creator
We describe the main protocols of our system using the common Alice & Bob notation. In this notation the statement "x sends the message m to y" is denoted x → y : m.
To denote a message m encrypted by a key K we note {m} K . To denote a message m signed by a key K −1 , we use the compact form {m} K −1 instead of the longer m.{h(m)} K −1 . This stresses that the signature does not protect confidentiality. We note x → dht(a) : m when x performs the operation P UT (a, m) over the DHT. We note dht(a) → x : m when x performs the operation m = GET (a) from the DHT. We denote a list as [, ] . Finally we use a.b for the concatenation of a and b.
Using this notation the general form of the capture mechanism is:
where type represents the message type as described bellow.
root Message for creating the root of a group or a principal. list Message for the management of a member list. wall Message for the management of a wall. join Message for a join request. once Nonce used in a subsequent join request. helo Indication that a join request is completed. name Optional publication of the group or principal name.
1) Creating a group: Creating a group mainly consists of capturing the DHT addresses for structures (root, list, wall) and publishing the group name in a directory. The group creator generates a set of keys
, S l , S w and plays the group creation protocol as follows:
Messages (1) (2) (3) set-up the data structure for the group. Message (1) may also contain keys among K l , K w , K i according to the group policy. Message (4) stores a signed and encrypted version of the member list counter c l at the address h(K i .0). This counter is used as an anti-replay protection for join requests as shown in the join protocol below. We choose the address h(K i .0) because it depends on K i and because it does not override the inbox h(K i ). Message (5) publishes the group name in a directory.
2) Creating a principal: The user generates a set of keys K −1 p , K p and captures the corresponding DHT address as follows:
A principal willing to remain anonymous will not publish the public key of her inbox and not publish any information into a directory.
3) Joining a group: This is the most important operation in our group management system. First the principal generates key pair K −1 j , K j . h(K j ) is an inbox for receiving messages from the administrator. In our example, h(K j ) is also used for receiving messages from other group members. Note that other applications may use two different inboxes here.
Then the operation has three main stages.
• The principal puts a join request.
• An administrator a gets and processes the join request.
• The principal retrieves the group information.
The counter c l is used in messages (3) and (7) to prevent replay attacks. It is signed and encrypted by administrators and used as a ticket in a join request. Upon processing the join request an administrator checks that the counter value corresponds to the counter value of the member list 3 .
In message (6), [X] is the current member list. The administrator sends message (8) for adding K p in the member list and update the counter accordingly.
In message (9) and (10) the value of [keys] depends on the group policy. The minimum is [] for a totally private group, typically for subscriptions to catalogs (see Table I ). The maximum is the full list of keys for a totally open group. For the example of Section II-A the list of keys is [S w , K −1 w ]. This lets anyone read/write the wall and keeps the user list private.
4) Taking actions in the group: After joining a group, a principal may enjoy group activities. In our example a principal will anonymously contribute to the shared document. We show the protocol exchange to do so in a minimalist model of a shared document (that just allows read and replace).
Equality is not stricly required: it is sufficient that the counter is greater than or equal to the current member list counter. This is useful when several administrators simultaneously handle a same join request: in this case only one administrator will fully process the request. In this version of the protocol however, we do not guarantee additional concurrency properties.
5) Public communications:
Anyone knowing h(K i ) may write a message in the corresponding inbox. p → dht(h(K i )) : mess.message Such communication can not be avoided in environments with no central authority. Optimistically this is an opportunity to contact principals that publish their address h(K i ). Pessimistically this is spam. Note that in our motivating example h(K i ) is never disclosed nor a fortiori K i , thus limiting the risk of spam. 6) Private communications: Our system allows private communications between users of a group. According to the group policy, members may learn the inbox key K i of other members directly from the member list, or through trusted external channels (such as direct communication between people). Private communication is thus systematically encrypted using the key K i , which makes it fundamentally different from an open communication.
p → dht(h(K i )) : {{mess.message} K −1 p } Ki In addition, a known mechanism can be used for hiding the IP address of the sender p to several adversary nodes. We provide here an example of such mechanism, directly adapted from Crowds [27] . α and β are random addresses in the DHT; p sends the message to α (1); the node handling the address α forwards the message either to β (2) with probability p f > 1/2, or otherwise directly to the final destination address (3). If the message arrives at β, the corresponding node executes the steps (2) and (3).
7) Key renewal: An administrator can decide to renew keys such as S w . The reason for a key renewal may be the banishment of a group member. The administrator sends the new keys to the inbox of each group member except the banned member. This is possible because the administrator knows the member list and the inboxes K j of members. Other more complex cases have to be considered such as cases where the administrator cannot directly address the group members (e.g. members haven't revealed their K j ). Further work will investigate the key renewal mechanisms in such cases.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
The proposed system is a system without authentication. No central authority and in particular no public key infrastructure (PKI) is required, which makes the system particularly scalable and simple to manage. Anyone may contribute to the system by providing resources and act as a node of the DHT. Also, anyone may participate and create groups, principals and the associated keys. This is not different from services such as Wikipedia where anyone may sign in and contribute without authenticating, or webmail services such as Hotmail or Yahoo Mail, where anyone can create as many accounts as he wants without authenticating. The disadvantages of such systems are that it is possible to squat on certain addresses or to flood the address space. As discussed in Section II, the address space of a DHT is typically 2 160 . We consider that an exhaustive flooding of the entire address space of the system is prohibitive. This cost of flooding may also be increased using computational puzzles, in a fully distributed and scalable way [10] . In addition, the usage of CGAs and the address capture mechanism (see Section III-B) reduces the risk for an adversary to squat on a particular address in the DHT. Applications using our group management system may independently implement their own authentication mechanism, thus controlling the users accessing the underlying system. For instance, the authentication mechanism can be centralized or distributed [20, 21] PKIs, email-address checking or CAPTCHAS. Any of those authentication systems can also be used to authenticate the nodes used by the system. However, the introduction of an authentication mechanism may impact the scalability of the system and reduce privacy.
A. Security analysis
The security of our group management system largely relies on cryptographic keys. If a key leaks, then the security of the corresponding right is broken (cf . Table II ). For instance, if a member discloses her key S w , the confidentiality of the group wall is broken. If an administrator discloses all his private keys, the join function is broken, as well as the confidentiality and integrity of all the group content. In this last case however, the group structure still holds and the group creator may create new administrator keys.
We now focus on security properties when the keys are not explicitly disclosed. First we verify that a DY adversary is not able to update a captured address, unless she captured it herself. Within the AVISPA framework [2] , we provide a formal specification of the capture mechanism as well as the security goal for the weak authentication of the entity that captures the address 4 .
The simulation shows that the unpredictability of the captured addresses is critical. If the DY adversary does not know a public key prior to the capture of the corresponding address, no attack is found. Otherwise, for instance if the adversary knows a key K l , the attack below exists (messages (1) to (5) ). The adversary i turns a predicted address into an inbox, so that it accepts any further message without verification:
i → dht(h(K l )) : mess.message (1) The group captures (2) and uses (3) (4) the predicted address without noticing any difference:
The adversary i(g) pretending to be g replays one former message that will be accepted without a signature and without increment verification. Here, the effect is the unauthorized removal of the principal p 2 from a group:
We also model the protocol for (i) creating a group, then (ii) creating a principal, and then (iii) joining the group. We assume a secure channel between the group creator and the future administrators. This channel is used for transferring the keys
The assumption is reasonable when an administrator is the group creator itself, or when a secret is shared (which we have modeled in the simulation). It is also possible that a creator and some administrator belong to the same private group.
We systematically verified the secrecy of the private keys and the symmetric keys against two different kinds of DY adversaries. They both control the messages send over the network. The first controls all the addresses from the DHT. The second controls all addresses except those involved in the management of the group and the principal; note that this adversary still controls all inbox addresses as well as addresses of type once.
For private groups, as the group in our toy example Section II-A, we obtain the secrecy of the group key K l against the two types of adversaries. We obtain the secrecy of the keys of the principal K i and K p against the second type of adversary.
B. Privacy discussion
We now discuss the extent to which our protocol meets the privacy objectives discussed in Section III-A with an adversary that adheres to the protocol but uses information from controlled nodes and observed messages to gain additional information.
Some of the privacy objectives are achieved thanks to the confidentiality of information. A single node storing a member list, a wall or an inbox can not read the content of the structures it stores because of encryption, which preserves member anonymity and sender anonymity. Member anonymity would be broken if the adversary retrieved the public keys K i or K p from group member lists, walls or inboxes. These structures are encrypted and only accessible to the group members or group administrators. Similarly, the sender anonymity of a private message would be broken if the adversary retrieved the public keys K i or K p from an inbox. The sender anonymity is preserved as each inbox private message is systematically encrypted with the receivers public key.
Member unlinkability also reduces to a confidentiality property. As a storing node does not know the member list it is impossible to link its members. Only other members of the same two groups would be able to link. A determined enough adversary may try to enroll in many groups until she links some principals. To protect against the latter attack a user may create different principals for different groups that he joins. A user may also renounce unlinkability for some principals that are enrolled in non-critical groups.
Only a very costly attack may break member unlinkability. The attack supposes that the adversary can observe the entire address space at a time (which is equivalent to a central authority). When an administrator just added a joining principal to the group, he updates the list structure and sends a message helo to the principals inbox. The adversary may observe these two structures updates occurring at approximately the same time, and thus infer that the principal of the inbox just joined the updated group. Repeating this same attack for a second group would then allow linking the two members. This attack only reveals the principal's inbox address and not its public key. Therefore it does not break member anonymity nor sender anonymity. In addition the attack is extremely costly as it requires to continuously monitor an address space of size 2 160 . We therefore consider this attack as unrealistic for our system.
Finally, unlinkability with IP addresses is achieved by randomly choosing other nodes as proxies as shown in Section III-C. From an adversary node perspective it is thus impossible to decide for a given message if the sender's IP address is the actual address of the sender.
V. PROTOTYPE
We have implemented a prototype of our protocol on top of the Vuze DHT as a proof of concept. The goal of this section is to show that (i) our protocol can be operated on top of a large scale deployed and possibly unmodified distributed storage infrastructure, and that (ii) performance is acceptable even in an extreme case of leveraging a DHT implemented for totally other (best effort) purposes.
A. Settings and challenges
In order to operate a prototype in a real world setting, we chose to build on Vuze (previously Azureus), a well known BitTorrent client that includes a DHT based on Kademlia [22] . Vuze has been adopted all around the world, and around 1.5 millions simultaneous users run Vuze DHT nodes from all over the Internet, resulting in various and representative latencies for a large scale application. It is possible to use Vuze for storing arbitrary data to an also arbitrary DHT address. Vanish [19] is a protocol that uses Vuze and provides improvements to parallelize PUT operations on the Vuze DHT; we re-use the code of Vanish to interface with the Vuze DHT. Our prototype uses the latest release of Vuze (4.7). As we do not control the code executed on remote Vuze's nodes, we can not force them to implement the verification we presented in Section III-B; they only act as simple nodes implementing a DHT interface.
The prototype runs on a commodity laptop (Intel Core2 Duo at 2.20GHz, 2.0GiB of memory), and uses a standard ADSL line (down/up: 18000Kbps/1200Kbps). The code is written in Java and cryptographic operations use the standard Java Security library.
Using Vuze as a storage back-end for our protocol is challenging for two reasons. The first one is that only 512B of data can be stored by a PUT (< key, value > insertion). This requires us to fragment the messages and lists created by our protocol into chunks to store them, and reversely to re-aggregate those chunks when a GET operation occurs. The second difficulty is that GET operations are relatively fast (order of a second), while PUT operations are prohibitively long (order of minutes) [19, 18] . Concurrency is to be kept in mind as some operations need to first get a state in the DHT and then write a result. We chose to operate despite those difficulties, in order to provide a best effort and worst case illustration of our protocol.
B. Scenario: joining and writing to a public group
The basic protocol functions, described in Section III-C, have been implemented; the considered scenario is presented on Figure 3 . It consists of creating a group, and simulating the arrival of join requests following a Poisson process with an average arrival every 20 minutes. An administrator bot frequently retrieves the group's inbox and always positively process those requests. This scenario correspond to joining a public group. A group member frequently retrieves the current member list and also reads/writes the group's wall following a Poisson process with average 30 minutes. This scenario was run continuously for a period of 63 hours.
C. Protocol evaluation
Prior to executing the scenario, we sequentially created 100 groups from our laptop, right after a cold start of the local Vuze DHT node. The first 3 or 4 creations take a significantly longer time (2 or 3 time longer) than the average 16.1 seconds per group creation (standard deviation: 6.2s). We re-ran the same group creation process, this time removing push operations of data to be stored on the DHT; average time drops to 0.66s per group. This underlines the fact that network operations totally dominate local structure manipulations and cryptographic operations. Figure 4 shows both the time needed by a group member to retrieve the group's wall, and the time needed to update the wall by appending few bytes to it (the length of a URL, for instance). As the 512B of allowed storage per insert are quickly filled by data and integrity information, our message chunking layer automatically splits the wall and attributes several locations in the DHT for the complete wall to be stored (first chunk still being at h(K w ), while following ones are stored at h(K w .i), with i the i th chunk). The resulting time to read slightly increases, being related to the time needed by the slowest node storing a chunk to answer. For the read operation a single answer from a chunk replica node is enough. In contrast, time needed to modify the wall is more fluctuating, as Vuze waits for replication on the 19 closest neighbors of the target node to be complete or to time out. Slow or loaded nodes slow down the PUT operation. Please note that, we have deliberately chosen to operate in a worst case setting, as we left the Vuze source code totally intact, this is in contrast to paper [19] where some modifications are made to the Vuze layer itself, which drastically reduced the storage time from minutes to seconds.
We now have a look at the time needed by the administrator to process each join request arriving in h(K i ), presented on Figure 5 . This constitutes the operation of our protocol under an increasingly unfavorable setting: at the end of this experiment, 170 joins have been completed, and the resulting member list (of only 54KB) is split into 108 chunks as indicated by value c on the figure. If we were able to store the structures related to joins (here the member list) on a single node, we would observe latency in the order of a minute. In contrast, the need to split the structure due to storage constraints makes our protocol rely on the slowest set of nodes chosen to store a chunk; we reach around 10 minutes of completion time at the end of the run in order to store that list on the 108 hosts and replicas. We clearly observe the fact that operation time for processing a join is tied to the number of chunks constituting the list: while time to write on group's wall ( Figure 4 ) remains mostly steady, join processing time increases gradually with the number of chunks (noted c on figure) . A sub-linear factor increase is nevertheless to be noted, when considering this number of chunks. Without any dedicated deployment, simply using Vuze may allow a best effort and a background group management system to operate, specially when human interaction is needed to accept or decline requests.
Directions for dedicated deployment and performance improvements are (i) allow a larger storage for < key, value > than the very restrictive 512B from Vuze; this would confine performances to the ones on the very left of those two previous curves. Secondly (ii), DHT operations should be optimized to return quickly, as proposed in Vanish implementation; this for instance includes a quick PUT of an operation result on the responsible node in the DHT, and then to leave consistency on replica nodes occur in background.
VI. RELATED WORK
Social applications are currently the main vectors of the growth of Internet use. We note that in most existing systems, the social group management functions are implemented independently, by each application, and in an ad-hoc fashion. We believe that our proposal goes in the direction of genericity, reusability and applicability. In the following, we review some of the prominent systems that take privacy into account.
Diaspora [15] proposes a completely distributed approach for Online Social Networks, in reaction to the recent privacy issues in Facebook. Today the project is still in alpha-phase and thus only open to a restricted number of users. We could not find any scientific publication on the protocols and security used. Similarly, [1, 13] social network services; access rights to resources are enforced at the file granularity. We precisely seek to enhance such approaches with the common and more flexible group abstraction. The approach in [1] also relies on a central certification service.
Persona [6] proposes the use of attribute based encryption [9] to implement fine-grained access policies on shared content. According to the set of groups a user belongs to he can decrypt a given content or not. Persona supposes that all shared content is encrypted. Thus revocation leads to reencrypting all contents that were accessible by the concerned group. The system has no specific requirement on the storage service that hosts the shared data and thus data may be stored in a distributed manner. Finally, Persona does not provide any specific privacy properties such as anonymity or unlinkability. Instead Persona targets the data confidentiality within a given group.
Backes et al. [4] present a security API/cryptographic framework for social applications providing access control on shared content, privacy of social relations, secrecy of resources, and anonymity of users. Similar to our approach, users of the system can create as many pseudonyms as they want and use a different pseudonym for each relation with the other users of the system. Access control lists are build upon the created relations. The system uses zero knowledge protocols to prove the possession of a pseudonym or the membership of a relation. Proving a relation membership does not reveal the pseudonym. The system has no specific requirement on the storage service that hosts the shared data and thus data may be stored in a distributed manner. However, the proposed system relies on a public key infrastructure and is thus inherently difficult to scale.
Schiavoi et al. [29] combines gossip-based communication protocols and onion routing to build a distributed and private group communication system. Groups consist of one or several nodes each of which knows the public key of the group. Onion routing is used to achieve sender anonymity, under the hypothesis that each node published a public key. Whilst we consider the same threat model regarding privacy properties, we extend the model to a Dolev-Yao adversary [16] with respect to security properties. In addition, we formally validate our security objectives against the latter attacker. We also address a larger set of operations, such as the creation of a principal and the join mechanism. Moreover we allow anonymous communication from any member of the group to any other member of the same the group.
Finally, one may find the concept of group management related to publish-subscribe mechanisms in distributed systems [11] . Such systems are typically building multicast trees among members for message propagation in groups. They differ from our proposed system in the sense that they are not meant to implement complex and privacy oriented group management, but instead focus on simple on-demand multicast.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed a distributed group management system without any single point of trust. Previous works have proposed partially distributed systems or considered a subset of the functions of group management. Distributing group management among many nodes potentially reduces the security of the overall system. Yet, this paper shows that good security and privacy properties can be reached. Our system also removes the control and lock of a single operator or organization on the group dynamic, improving state of the art in the direction of scalable and reusable application.
Future work will focus on the key renewal protocol to support cases where the group administrator does not know the group members. We will also focus on adaptation mechanisms to balance load for very popular groups.
